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Examining the Lived World:  
The Place of Phenomenology in Psychiatry and Clinical Psychology 
 





This paper aims to explore the validity of phenomenology in the psychiatric setting. The 
phenomenological method - as a mode of research, a method of engagement between self and 
other, and a framework for approaching what it means to know - has found a legitimate home 
in therapeutic practice. Over the last century, phenomenology, as a philosophical endeavour 
and research method, has influenced a wide range of disciplines, including psychiatry. 
Phenomenology has enabled an enrichment of such practice through deepening the way in 
which we can come to know the experiences of the other. This knowing-of-the-other is explored 
here within the context of psychiatric and clinical assessment. The question asked is: How best 
can we come to know those we work with? What method of engagement can be used to most 
completely come to understand and narrate the experiences of the individual, and how can this 
be applied in the context of an assessment aimed at psychiatric or psychological intervention? 
Elements of phenomenological praxis are presented as definitive of the most integral way of 
approaching the human subject. Husserlian and Heideggerian notions are explicated and 
related to phenomenological conceptions of intersubjectivity, in an effort to describe a 




The intention of this paper is to propose the 
phenomenological method as an important attitudinal 
stance, which could lend a greater degree of 
consideration to the position of individual subjectivity 
within the systematics of diagnostic assessment and 
psychiatric intervention. As broadly intended in this 
paper, the notion of phenomenology as an “attitudinal 
stance” envisages phenomenology as an attendance to 
the lived world of the experiencing individual that is 
grounded in the individual’s narrations of that 
experience. The attitudinal stance of phenomenology 
is further conceptualised as an openness to the full 
potential of the world-disclosive capacity of an 
individual’s descriptions. In this sense, phenomeno-
logy’s approach to the individual’s narrative of 
experience is conceived of as fundamentally 
invitational. Further to this, and in relation to 
phenomenology as invitational methodology, is 
phenomenology’s welcoming of ambiguity or 
ambivalence as an important constituting factor in the 
individual’s narration of his or her being-in-the-
world. 
  
In arguing for a phenomenologically informed 
approach to psychiatric assessment, I shall firstly 
present an outline of the psychiatric assessment 
process as it emerges in common practice. I shall then 
describe a model of phenomenological praxis so as to 
acquaint readers with the specific phenomenological 
tenets considered most applicable to psychiatric 
assessment. Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology will 
be explicated more centrally, with some commentary 
on the notions of Martin Heidegger. This explication 
will precede an account of phenomenology’s potential 
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space, as it were, within psychiatric practice. A 
consideration of empathy as a valid intersubjective 
experience, which could contribute to a solid, 
phenomenologically informed psychiatric assessment, 
will conclude the argument presented in this paper. 
 
A Sketching of the Psychiatric Assessment Process 
 
Insofar as this paper is intended as a 
phenomenologically informed critique of the 
psychiatric assessment procedure, it is necessary to 
clarify the nature of this procedure as it is commonly 
shaped in clinical practice. Psychiatric assessment 
unfolds in clinical practice as a fairly rigidly 
structured attempt on the part of the clinician to 
formulate an understanding of an individual, focused 
on diagnosis and prognosis. The assessment process 
is structured as a motion towards gleaning 
information regarding situationally relevant aspects of 
the individual’s world. The assessment process opens 
with an exploration of what is termed the “presenting 
problem”, and is geared towards establishing the 
emerging difficulties experienced by the individual, 
as those difficulties have been disclosed 
chronologically in the individual’s world. The 
presenting problem should be shaped as an open-
ended exploration of the individual’s experience, as 
the individual narrates that experience. However, it is 
noted that the presenting problem is often explored in 
relation to the clinician’s attempt to elicit the clinical 
symptomatology with which the individual presents. 
 
The family history is then explored, with significant 
emphasis placed on any historically emerging 
psychiatric or general medical symptomatology. 
Typically, individuals are asked to respond to specific 
questions determined by the clinician, which 
questions are crucially disclosed as the clinician’s 
attempt to establish the aetiology of the individual’s 
mental illness, as that aetiology relates to the 
individual’s membership of his or her family. The 
clearly channelled exploration of family history is 
followed by a rigidly structured exploration of the 
individual’s personal history. The exploration of 
childhood unfolds primarily as an attempt to elicit any 
developmental delays, anomalies, neuroses and 
illnesses. The individual is once again asked specific 
questions, which are intended to provide an indication 
of the possible emergence of mental ill-health in the 
course of the individual’s childhood. Importantly, the 
salience of various aspects of the individual’s life is 
determined by the clinician, and this determination of 
salience relates to the specific questions which the 
clinician asks the individual. This element of the 
assessment process will be specifically criticised as 
manifesting a lack of phenomenological integrity 
within that process. 
 
The examination of the individual’s mental state 
follows the exploration of familial and personal 
history. Less important in terms of its impact on the 
phenomenological astuteness of the assessment 
process, the mental state examination is shaped as an 
objective assessment of the individual’s behaviour, 
speech and appearance, his or her cognitive functions, 
such as memory, and his or her executive functions, 
such as abstract reasoning. The mental state 
examination further assesses the individual’s capacity 
for insight and judgement, as well as his or her 
perceptual faculty. The overriding aim of the mental 
state examination is to contribute to established 
notions regarding the presence, absence, or nature of 
mental illness with which the individual presents. 
 
A Model of Phenomenological Praxis Outlined 
 
I shall now proceed with an explication of the 
phenomenological methodology proposed here as 
having the potential to contribute to the integrity of 
the assessment process. Phenomenology, as a 
philosophy devoted to an attempt to clearly reveal 
human experience, is seen as a tool that can be 
successfully applied to research and practice in the 
human sciences. In an attempt to validate this claim, it 
is necessary firstly to articulate an understanding of 
Husserlian phenomenology, relating it to clinical 
practice. In essence, Husserl attempted to develop a 
theory of knowledge that did not rely on 
psychological explanation. Most essential to 
Husserl’s phenomenology, and most debated, is the 
notion that human experience can be best explored by 
describing the immediate and lived world in which 
that experience takes place (Husserl, 1913/1972). 
Human subjectivity is grasped within the 
phenomenological stance as living beyond the self, 
and in the space between self and world (Kruger, 
1988). Subjectivity is therefore seen solely in terms of 
its being-in-the-world, as constituted by the objects of 
the world which fill individual consciousness (Valle 
& Halling, 1989). As it was intended by Husserl, 
phenomenology emerges as primarily descriptive: 
“The phenomeno-logist is obsessed by the concrete” 
(Van den Berg, 1972, quoted in Brooke, 1991). In 
their approach to the experience being explored, 
phenomenologists must thus attempt to disqualify 
accepted prejudices which may disrupt apprehension 
of the experience being observed and described. 
 
Immediate lived experience is given informative 
priority in phenomenology, and is disclosed in 
phenomenological practice as a necessary return to 
the lived world, and a return to the disclosure of the 
phenomenon being observed in its lived world 
(Giorgi, 1971). To describe the essence of an 
Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology, Volume 7, Edition 1 May 2007  Page 3 of 8 
 
 
The IPJP is a joint project of Rhodes University in South Africa and Edith Cowan University in Australia. This document is subject to 
copyright and may not be reproduced in whole or in part via any medium (print, electronic or otherwise) without the express permission of the 
publishers. 
 
The Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology (IPJP) can be found at www.ipjp.org. 
 
observed phenomenon is to return to the disclosure of 
that phenomenon in lived experience, such that it may 
reveal itself in deeper and subtler ways. In this light, 
phenomenological description is grasped as 
something other than a mere interpretation of a 
phenomenon. As understood phenomenologically, 
description is not opposed to interpretation, but 
interpretation must be thoroughly descriptive in order 
to preserve the integrity of the essence being 
described (Spiegelberg, 1972). This notion relates to 
the primary phenomenological axiom that reality is 
not so much experienced as interpreted. Accordingly, 
it is suggested that what we experience as real is in 
fact a constitution of a variety of informed 
interpretations (ibid.). Phenomenology essentially has 
its origins in the realisation of the possibility that 
these interpretations can be wrong, and thus the 
phenomenological investigator of experience aims his 
or her project at pure description rather than 
potentially misinformed interpretation. 
 
Fundamental to description, as grasped phenomeno-
logically, is the notion of reduction as the foundation 
of observation and interpretation within the context of 
describing lived phenomena. In research and practice, 
the phenomenological reduction emerges as the 
researcher’s attempt to bracket off from awareness 
those knowledges - linguistic, cultural, historical, 
scientific, or ideological - which may prejudice or 
incorrectly inform their observations of the 
phenomenon being described (Giorgi, 1970; Husserl, 
1913/1972). This reduction, or bracketing, languaged 
phenomenologically as the epoché, is most 
specifically focused as an attempt to disconnect from 
the natural scientific attitude (ibid.). Husserl’s main 
target in imposing the epoché was to negate 
naturalism, which he perceived as an unjustified faith 
in positivist philosophy as being the ultimate source 
of truth (Martin, 2002). Husserl felt that science could 
not comprehend and narrate the human and lived 
experience of being-in-the-world. It was in response 
to his perception of a gaping hole in scientific and 
humanistic practice that Husserl aimed to generate, 
through phenomenology, an essentially pre-
suppositionless philosophy (Ashworth, 1996). In 
Husserl’s method, pure phenomenology is disclosed 
methodologically as a suspension of belief in those 
things which can be doubted, and a dismantling of 
those prejudices which could misdirect our 
description of the essence of a phenomenon. In his 
attempt to avoid the essential colonisation of 
naturalism in relation to coming to know the essence 
of human experience, Husserl moved towards 
empiricism, intending an appeal to experience as 
being the more rational repository of truth. Husserl 
proposed a radical empiricism, in which pure 
experience is given as the most essential source of 
truth. Husserl’s method does not doubt that there is an 
external truth. Through the phenomenological 
reduction, he simply aims to prevent external truths 
from interfering with and invading his descriptions of 
the experiencing individual (Husserl, 1927/1971). As 
a way of containing the force of presupposition, the 
epoché thus enables a focus on, and a description of, 
the phenomenon from within that phenomenon’s 
lived world (Maloney, 1986). 
 
Grasping the phenomenon as a pure essence within its 
immediately lived world permits a method of being-
with the individual, and narrating that individual’s 
experience, without embellishing upon the essence. 
Fundamental to the phenomenological return to the 
essence is the notion of intuition within the 
intersubjective analytical space (Natterson & 
Friedman, 1995). Essential intuition, for Husserl, 
amounts to an attempt to come to know the pure 
phenomenon as it is subjectively experienced. The 
essence is not perceived, but intuited. Objects in the 
world are revealed through our intuition, and intuition 
is grasped within phenomenology as enabling the 
most integral description of the phenomenon as it 
presents itself to the examiner of human experience. 
Intuition is further understood as emerging prior to 
presupposition, and is therefore framed phenomeno-
logically as the most accurate method of narrating the 
lived world of the individual. In order to provide a 
theoretical grounding for this notion in pheno-
menology, Heidegger’s conceptualisation of the lived 
world will now be presented briefly. 
 
Heidegger structures the lived world as the world 
immediately experienced: the world as it is revealed 
to individual consciousness in every moment of 
being. An investigation of the lived world of an 
individual is therefore not grasped as a conceptually 
bound exploration of a specific phenomenon, but 
rather as an attempt to make intelligible the full range 
of experience which the individual lives at every 
moment of being (Heidegger, 1927/1962). The lived 
world is understood as that which can be disclosed 
through the projection of one’s vision onto the full 
range of possibilities of world disclosure with which 
the individual is presented. The Heideggerian 
phenomenologist’s vision should be given as an 
openness to the experience of the other, for the other 
to narrate the manifold possible world-relations which 
are his or her being-in-the-world (ibid.). At the same 
time as being fully present to the untold array of 
possibility which is the individual’s lived world, 
Heidegger points to the importance within the 
phenomenological stance of realising our inter-
relatedness with the other (Moran, 2000). In this 
sense, the investigator of experience, as a self in 
relation to the other, is incorporated into the other’s 
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lived world to the extent that the reality of that lived 
world is altered. And so, in terms of coming to know 
the individual, being-fearful, being-domineering, 
being-mild or being-proud in relation to the other are 
all ways of being-with which constitute the other’s 
experience of self. Therefore, in the context of aiming 
at a phenomenologically astute description of the 
other, being with the other changes the nature of that 
description. It is for this reason, again, that 
phenomenologically oriented practitioners must aim 
towards a bracketing in their descriptions of the other, 
and must question the extent to which their external 
and subjective truths shape and inform, or misinform, 
their understanding of the individual’s narration of his 
or her own lived experience. In asking this question, it 
is important to focus on how engaging in the process 
of attempting to understand a specific phenomenon is 
impinged upon by the construction and imposition of 
external truths onto that phenomenon. 
 
Apart from the tenets of description and the epoché, 
described here from within Husserlian and 
Heideggerian frameworks, there is one final principle, 
that of horizonalisation, that needs to be explicated. 
Horizonalisation as a phenomenological practice 
encourages an avoidance of imposing any initial 
hierarchies of meaning onto the individual’s narrative 
of his or her experience (Moustakas, 1994). 
Horizonalisation is aimed at treating the entire 
narrative as being comprised of units of meaning, all 
of which hold equal importance in terms of describing 
and coming to know the individual from within his or 
her lived world. This principle is founded on the 
notion that, through avoiding assumptions of 
hierarchy, the examiner of experience is better able to 
describe that experience, with less prejudice, and 
greater subtlety. We can now proceed to consider the 
phenomenological methodology presented in terms of 
its potential application to psychiatric assessment. 
 
Applying the Phenomenological Method: An 
Answer to a Problematised Assessment Process 
 
As previously noted, this paper intends to show that 
phenomenology can hold a legitimate space in 
psychiatric and clinical practice. This intention is 
grounded in a rich academic history of works aimed 
toward establishing the utility of phenomenology in 
the human sciences (Boss, 1979; Kiesler, 2000; 
Kraus, 1987; Szasz, 1973; Van den Berg, 1987). As 
we have established, part of phenomenology’s 
multifarious intention is to enable a method of 
coming to know essential human experience by 
disallowing the intrusion of interpretations that are 
informed by an ever-widening gyre of knowledges 
(Knaack, 1984). To do this, we are given the tools of 
description and epoché, which are aimed at narrating 
the essence of experience as it is most immediately 
grounded in the world. But how could a 
phenomenological methodology be utilised in a 
problematised psychiatric assessment procedure? In 
applying the phenomenological method, one would 
firstly need to set aside any biases or assumptions 
which may predispose the assignment of particular 
meanings to the phenomenon being described. 
Instead, it is necessary initially to remain open to the 
manifold possible meanings which could be being 
disclosed through the individual’s interrelation with 
his or her world. This would suggest putting into 
abeyance, insofar as is possible, the variety of 
knowledges which may infiltrate and interrupt our 
hearing of the narrative (Spinelli, 1989). It would 
imply allowing the story to speak for itself, without 
attaching or enforcing onto that story a system of 
expected truths which may misshape it (Moustakas, 
1994). Secondly, in being open to the untold range of 
possible self-world disclosures, the focus of attention 
is forced away from theoretical explanations of the 
phenomenon, and attendance to the immediate lived 
experience becomes enabled. It is through attending 
initially to the immediate experience, and through 
describing the experience as concretely as possible, 
that one is able to assign to that experience some form 
of interpretation. The third practical step towards 
imposing the phenomenological method relates to the 
principle of horizonalisation, and is focused on at 
least initially giving equal importance to each unit of 
meaning expressed in the description of lived 
experience (Spinelli, 1989). 
 
Consideration of the horizonalisation rule is 
particularly germane to this paper’s aim to reveal 
phenomenology’s importance within psychiatric 
practice. As has been noted, the psychiatric 
assessment process is typically defined by the 
clinician’s search for specific behaviours, described 
in the psychiatric lexicon as symptoms. These 
behaviours, or symptoms, are given weight in terms 
of their contribution to the clinician’s identification 
of a psychiatric disorder, as indicated by the 
recognition of symptoms. Behaviours identified as 
symptomatic of illness are given explanatory weight 
in terms of the individual’s presentation. These 
behaviours are focused upon, emphasized, and given 
priority. In relation to this, those behaviours not seen 
as symptomatic are given less consideration. It can 
be seen how this process may devalue and ignore 
non-symptomatic behaviours. It is thus evident that a 
more phenomenologically informed approach, which 
encourages placing equal priority on all emerging 
behaviours, may facilitate a fuller and more accurate 
understanding and description of the individual. 
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It is suggested that, once these three steps have been 
implemented, one is enabled to arrive at a narrative of 
the lived experience that is accurately derived from 
the immediacy of that experience. It is now necessary 
to evaluate phenomenology in terms of its place in 
psychological practice and psychiatric assessment. 
Although not intended to delineate phenomenological 
praxis as a stepwise process, the simple clarification 
as presented in this paper serves as the platform upon 
which phenomenology’s entry into the psychiatric 
arena is staged. From there, it is appropriate to 
proceed with an exploration of current conceptions of 
phenomenology from within psychiatric and 
institutional practice. 
 
The meaning of phenomenology has been 
transformed in psychiatric parlance to denote the 
symptomatic descriptions of the diagnostic system 
(Gupta & Kay, 2002). Practitioners in psychiatric 
settings undertake diagnostic assessments to describe, 
apprehend and aid those who seek help. The 
practitioner attempts to identify signs and symptoms 
which would indicate the presence of a specific 
diagnosis. Through a process of gleaning information 
regarding the individual’s family and personal 
history, as well as a systematized observation aimed 
at describing the individual’s mental status, the 
practitioner is enabled to arrive at a diagnosis of the 
presenting problem, and is further enabled to 
formulate ideas regarding aetiology. Gupta and Kay 
suggest that this assessment process is described in 
psychiatry as being phenomenological in its method. 
 
In light of the phenomenological method described 
above, I propose to challenge the notion that the 
psychiatric assessment procedure can be considered 
phenomenologically rigorous. It has been argued that 
psychiatric diagnosis, as formulated within the DSM 
system, manifests a theoretical predisposition 
towards a behavioural mode of describing experience 
(Gupta & Kay, 2002). As such, it is suggested that 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders takes mental disorder as being inherently 
located in behavioural deviance. In this light, it is 
self-evident that a diagnostic system that bases its 
descriptions of human experience in a behavioural 
predisposition cannot be considered to be 
presuppositionless, as it directly presupposes the 
priority of the behavioural in terms of its 
understanding of being-in-the-world (ibid.). Further 
to this, DSM diagnosis is challenged as being 
phenomenologically unsound insofar as it manifests 
as criteriologically based, and is therefore considered 
inconsistent with the phenomenological approach. 
Kraus (1994, in Gupta & Kay, 2002) questions the 
potential for a subjective description of human 
experience in the context of psychiatric diagnostic 
assessment, and differentiates between the 
criteriological diagnostic system and a more strictly 
phenomenological approach. Kraus’s argument is 
based primarily on the proposition that the 
criteriological approach to diagnosis predefines the 
individual’s experience. “Rather than allowing the 
individual to define his or her own subjective 
experience, experiences are accepted or rejected only 
insofar as they correspond to operationalized criteria 
that are accepted as defining the disorder. 
Behavioural criteria tend to render the individual’s 
subjectivity subservient to diagnosis. Patients’ 
histories are primarily useful for providing 
corroborating information from which psychiatrists 
can identify and select symptoms to match against 
diagnostic criteria” (Kraus, 1994, quoted in Gupta & 
Kay, 2002, p. 78). In this process can be seen a 
methodological emphasis on specific elements of the 
individual’s narrative, which is noted in contrast with 
the phenomenological principle of horizonalisation 
proposed here as a potential contributor to the rigour 
and integrity of the assessment process. 
 
Empathy, Intersubjectivity and Phenomenological 
Psychiatry 
 
In light of the phenomenological agenda, as presented 
in this paper, it is now necessary to pose the question: 
What could phenomenology offer psychiatry and 
clinical psychology? It is proposed here that 
phenomenology could hold a legitimate space in 
clinical practice. It is suggested that phenomenology 
may be used to complement and enhance the process 
of assessment within psychiatry and clinical 
psychology (Hersch, 2003). In terms of the possibility 
for a phenomenologically astute application within 
psychiatric intervention, I shall now explore 
phenomenology’s conception of intersubjectivity, 
specifically focusing on the disclosure of empathy 
and understanding within the intersubjective context. 
 
Intersubjectivity emerges as an important aspect of 
phenomenological philosophy, and unfolds as 
enabling the emergence of knowledge regarding 
human experience (Natterson & Friedman, 1995). It 
is here proposed that the phenomenological 
conception of understanding, or verstehen, emerges 
as an empathically led method of engaging 
intersubjectively with the other, which can give 
credence to the psychiatric assessment process. Most 
simply defined, empathy emerges as an attempt by 
the self to come to know the subjectively lived 
experience of the other. Importantly, phenomenology 
holds that empathic responsiveness must occur 
whilst maintaining the distanciated stance of the 
objective observer. Husserl describes empathy as an 
intuitive reliving of the experience of the other, 
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whilst acknowledging that the experience “belongs” 
to the other. Further to this, empathy emerges as a 
way of attending to the lived experience by existing 
in relation to the other in the imaginal, intuitive 
mode (Churchill, 1998; Willis, 2001). This method 
of understanding has thematic similarities to aspects 
of hermeneutic phenomenology, in which 
understanding emerges as a phenomenal re-
experiencing of the individual from within his or her 
world of lived experience (Hein & Austin, 2001). 
This focus on re-experiencing an event aims at 
intuiting the structure of an event from within the 
experiencing individual’s frame of reference. 
Empathy is therefore depicted phenomenologically 
as an intersubjectively framed position in which one 
can come to know the lived experience of another 
through intuition, whilst acknowledging the 
empathic response as one’s own private experience. 
From this perspective, it is important to acknowledge 
the limits inherent in the process of coming to know 
the other. The intention is to attempt to prevent our 
limits in understanding from impeding our 
descriptions of the phenomenon being observed. 
Phenomenology thus depicts the empathic 
experience as one fundamentally shared between self 
and other, and yet one in which the self 
acknowledges its separateness from the other with 
whom it is engaging in an intersubjective empathic 
communication. 
 
Empathy and the phenomenological conception of 
verstehen are proposed as potentially facilitative of 
clinical practice. Empathic responsiveness could 
enable and deepen psychiatric assessment by 
allowing for an intersubjective apprehension of 
individual lived experience, beyond the confinement 
that is diagnostic description. As a way of being-with 
the other intersubjectively, empathy could enable our 
knowing of individually lived experiences such as 
anxiety, depression, trauma and even psychotic 
breakage, by generating a richer and more authentic 
apprehension of such experiences as the individual 
lives them. Through attending to the intersubjective 
space, and through engaging imaginally (Churchill, 
1998) in an intuitive, empathic mode, the clinician 
may become able to further describe and narrate 
individual experiences of psychopathological 
presentations. Gupta and Kay (2002) suggest that 
such an empathically led apprehension of the 
individual, if infused in the psychiatric assessment 
process, may allow for more accurate and sensitive 
predictions of prognosis, and more appropriate 
treatment plans, with both of these thoroughly 
informed by the immediacy of the individual’s lived 
experience. 
 
It is important, however, to problematise Gupta and 
Kay’s focus on empathy as a phenomenologically 
rigorous mode of engagement. As was noted earlier, 
phenomenology encourages a bracketing off of one’s 
subjectivity with respect to one’s apprehension of 
other beings-in-the-world. With this in mind, then, it 
could be argued that empathy, as a deeply subjective 
experience, falls short of phenomenological 
aspirations in respect of applying the epoché. How 
can empathy, as a subjectively informed experience, 
be reconciled with the aim of phenomenological 
methodology in encouraging a degree of bracketing? 
It is suggested that empathy, as an intuitive and 
intersubjectively grounded apprehension, needs to be 
held within the clinician’s awareness, put at bay, 
considered, and reflected upon. In this sense, 
empathic responsiveness must be considered as 
always and only a potential enabler of description. 
Empathic intuition must be reflected upon by the 
individual, and checked for validity. Empathy must 
therefore be approached imaginally as a potential 
apprehension. In relation to the individual presenting 
with symptoms indicative of psychiatric illness, then, 
clinicians must necessarily extend their empathic 
apprehensions invitationally, asking the individual 
whether such apprehensions are accurately reflective 
of his or her own experience. Kvale’s (1996) notion 
of intersubjective validation within the research 
interview context can be considered here as an apt 
model in terms of employing empathy to enable 
phenomenologically sound description. Kvale 
encourages researchers to hold their empathic 
intuitions reflectively, acknowledging how their own 
ideologies may have informed such intuitions. 
Further to this, Kvale encourages a mutual validation 
process, in which the researcher asks the interviewee 
whether his or her (the researcher’s) intuitions are 
accurate in terms of the interviewee’s experience. It 
is suggested that this approach to phenomenological 
research, if applied to the process of psychiatric 
assessment, could enable a phenomenologically valid 
assessment approach. 
 
By way of concluding this paper, it is suggested that 
phenomenology’s return to the essence, and its 
attendance to the “things themselves” as disclosed 
within the lived world (Willis, 2001), gives to 
clinical assessment a descriptive density which could 
enhance criteriological diagnosis, such that it may 
become more truly reflective of lived experience. 
This enhancement, it is suggested, would be 
characterised by phenomenology’s facilitating a 
fundamentally causal diagnostic description. Further 
to this, in aiming towards a phenomenologically 
rigorous methodology, the assessment process would 
yield information about the individual that is 
unclouded by the variety of knowledges which may 
impinge upon and obfuscate our knowing of that 
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individual. The adoption of the phenomenological 
reduction through the epoché, as well as 
horizonalisation, would enable a subjective 
description which, combined with the variety of 
clinical assessment tools available, could render a 
clinically thorough description of a particular 
individual, as situated uniquely within his or her own 
lived world. The focus on empathic immersion 
within the assessment process, as advocated by the 
phenomenological method proposed in this paper, 
could further deepen our knowing of the individual 
by enabling an intersubjective apprehension of 
experience from within the world in which that 
experience is occurring, whilst preserving the 
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